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ABSTRACT 
This thesis aspires to identify how Mali can develop effective agencies without 
jeopardizing its process of re-democratization. Specifically, it seeks to determine which 
mechanisms of democratic control and oversight Mali needs to institutionalize in 
its intelligence sector. Looking at how Romania and Spain—two new democracies 
that underwent transitions to democracy before Mali—have institutionalized 
democratic reform of intelligence, this thesis finds that Mali should develop standards, 
procedures and mechanisms allowing for democratic and civil control, as well as the 
supervision of intelligence services; promote expertise capabilities for more effective 
intelligence agencies; and institutionalize specific educational and training requirements, 
as well as the transparency and cooperation of intelligence services.
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In 2012, a coup by Captain Amadou Sanogo, which overthrew the democratically 
elected President Amadou Toumani Touré, abruptly interrupted Mali’s nearly two decades 
of democratic consolidation. A few months later, against the background of international 
intervention, Mali held free and fair elections in July 2013, and elected Ibrahim Boubacar 
Keïta as president and marked Mali’s return to democracy.1 While Mali’s new 
democratically elected government has posted certain accomplishments in terms of policy 
(decentralization) and economic reforms, it has not institutionalized democratic reform of 
the intelligence institutions.2  
The democratization of intelligence—a tradeoff between democratic civilian 
control and effectiveness of intelligence3—forms a pressing requirement for the new 
administration to fulfill the democratic demands for transparency, accountability, and 
oversight, and to meet the national security requirements for effective intelligence as the 
first line of defense against security threats and challenges.4 Nevertheless, democratic 
reform of intelligence does not seem to interest policymakers in Mali much. This thesis 
                                                 
1 In 2012, northern Mali had fallen into the hands of a coalition of rebel and terrorists’ groups in the 
aftermath of a military coup. In January 2013, France, backed by African troops, intervened at the request 
of the Malian authorities to chase away the terrorist groups. In July 2013, elections were organized, then 
the United Nations authorized a stabilization force, requested by the Economic Community of West 
African States and the African Union. Bruno Charbonneau and Jonathan M. Sears, “Fighting for Liberal 
Peace in Mali? The Limits of International Military Intervention,” Journal of Intervention and State 
building 8, no. 2-3 (2014): 192-213, https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2014.930221. 
2 In Mali, three structures in charge of intelligence exist, namely the General Directorate of State 
Security (DGSE), the Directorate General Information of the Directorate of the National Police, and the 
General Directorate of Military Intelligence. These structures, which date back to the time of socialist style 
dictatorship Moussa Traoré, in 1968-1991, lack a properly defined set of roles and missions, and thus are 
lagging behind in terms of effectiveness. “Mali,” Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index,” accessed 
December 8, 2017, http://government.defenceindex.org/countries/mali/; Bakary Mariko, “Le Mali: Un pays 
sans services de renseignements” [Mali: a country without intelligence services],”Maliweb, September 24, 
2013, http://www.maliweb.net/contributions/le-mali-un-pays-sans-services-de-renseignements-
171535.html. 
3 Thomas C. Bruneau and Cristiana Matei, “Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization 
and Civil-military Relations,” Democratization 15, no. 5 (December 2008): 909, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/
13510340802362505. 
4 Paul Shemella and Nicholas Tomb, Security Forces in African States: Cases and 
Assessment (Amherst, NY: Cambria Press, 2017), 115.  
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seeks to examine the challenges of Malian’s democratization of intelligence. It also aspires 
to identify a model for successful democratic reform of intelligence for Mali. 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
How can Mali develop effective intelligence agencies without jeopardizing the 
process of re-democratization? Which mechanisms of democratic control and oversight do 
Mali need to institutionalize over intelligence? 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Mali’s democratic consolidation depends on effective intelligence institutions that 
also remain under democratic civilian control.5 So far, while democratic civilian control 
exists at least on paper, intelligence effectiveness is negligible.6 This thesis is important 
for decision-makers in Mali because it exposes the challenges and critical intelligence- 
transformation issues in terms of transparency, openness, accountability, and effectiveness 
of intelligence. 
This investigation is also relevant to policymakers in countries that undergo similar 
political transformations as did Mali. It provides them with useful lessons when 
undertaking intelligence democratization in their countries. 
This thesis is also important for Mali’s security assistance donors—the United 
Nations, the European Union, and the United States. The support provided to Malian state 
falls within the framework of strengthening institutional governance and the rule of law. It 
focuses on the consolidation of democracy through strong institutions, the security sector 
reform, and the fight against global terrorism.  
                                                 
5 Thomas C. Bruneau and Cristiana Matei, “Intelligence Reform in New Democracies: Factors 
Supporting or Arresting Progress,” Democratization 18, no. 3 (June 2011): 602-630, https://doi.org/
10.1080/13510347.2011.586257. 
6 National Democratic Institute, Strengthening Democratic Control and Oversight of the Security 
Sector in the Sahel Region (Bamako, Mali: NDI, 2015), https://www.ndi.org/Sahel-Security-Sector-
governance; Eeben Barlow, “Mali - Another Intelligence Failure,” Eeben Barlow’s Military and Security 
Blog, March, 25, 2012, http://eebenbarlowsmilitaryandsecurityblog.blogspot.com/2012/03/mali-another-
intelligence-failure.html. 
3 
The Security Governance Initiative (SGI), an Obama administration initiative, 
takes these challenges into account in a holistic manner, from the politico-strategic level to 
the strategic-structural level.7 Thus, this research is all the more important to the United 
States and other donors, as it highlights the enormity of the work that remains to be done.  
Finally, this thesis is relevant to the literature of intelligence and democracy, which 
is very scarce in empirical studies of intelligence democratization in Africa. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Although no scientific work on intelligence democratization in Mali exists, the fact 
remains that a rich literature exists on the role of intelligence in a democracy, which helps 
to clarify some concepts of this thesis. This section details these foundational concepts. 
1. Defining Intelligence 
Greg Hannah, Kevin A. O’Brien, and Andrew Rathmell claim, “Intelligence is a 
special kind of knowledge, a specialized subset of information that has been put through a 
systematic analytical process in order to support a state’s decision and policymakers. It 
exists because some states or actors seek to hide information from other states or actors, 
who in turn seek to discover hidden information by secret or covert means.”8 In contrast, 
Alan Breakspear defines it as “a company’s ability to predict change over time to do 
something about it. Capacity involves foresight and insight, and aims to identify the 
imminent change that can be positive, representing the opportunity, or negative, 
representing the threat.”9 Stan A. Taylor, in his concept of definitions and theories of 
intelligence, states that  
intelligence refers to the needed information policymakers identify to make 
a better decision regarding any entity they must deal with. It also refers to 
the prioritization, collection, analysis, production, and use of that 
                                                 
7 White House, Security Governance Initiative (Washington, DC: Office of the Press Secretary, 2014). 
https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/254115.pdf. 
8 Greg Hannah, Kevin A. O’Brien, and Andrew Rathmell, Intelligence and Security Legislation for 
Security Sector Reform (Cambridge: RAND Europe, 2005), 1-5.  
9 Alan Breakspear, “A New Definition of Intelligence,” Intelligence and National Security 28, no. 5 
(October 2013): 678-693, https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.699285. 
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information by the organizations and groups. Finally, it refers to the other 
activities of several groups who participate in the intelligence cycle and the 
information and insights that flow from this process.10 
On the same note, Michael Handel notes that “the proper use of accurate, timely 
intelligence can significantly reduce uncertainty, thereby enabling political and military 
leaders to improve the quality of their decisions, develop more effective strategies, or 
conduct more successful military operations.”11  
Mark M. Lowenthal defines intelligence in a more comprehensive way. For 
Lowenthal, “intelligence is the process by which specific types of information important 
to national security are requested, collected, analyzed and provided to policy makers; the 
products of that process; the safeguarding of these processes and the information by 
counterintelligence activities, and the carrying out of the operations as requested by lawful 
authorities.”12 He adds that intelligence is an organization with units that perform several 
functions.13 Other scholars like Loch Johnson define intelligence as having three types of 
activities carried out by secret agencies: “first and foremost, they are expected to gather 
and interpret information from around the world.… Second, the agencies are expected to 
protect U.S. government secret from espionage by other government.… Third, from time 
to time they have been directed to oppose nation’s adversaries through the use of aggressive 
clandestine operations abroad.”14  
2. On Intelligence Democratization 
There is a robust body of literature addressing the challenges/obstacles and triggers 
for democratic reform of intelligence. For Timothy Edmunds, 
                                                 
10 Stan A. Taylor, “The Role of Intelligence in National Security,” in Contemporary Security Studies 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 250. 
11 Michael Handel, “Leaders and Intelligence” in Leaders and Intelligence, ed. Michael Handel 
(Totowa NJ: Frank Cass & Co Ltd., 1989), 3, https://doi.org/10.1080/02684528708431914. 
 
12 Mark M. Lowenthal, “What Is Intelligence,” in Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, ed. Mark M. 
Lowenthal (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2016), 6. 
13 Lowenthal. 
14 Loch K. Johnson, Secret Agencies: U.S. Intelligence in a Hostile World (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1998), ix. 
5 
Democratization in the intelligence sector thus entails reform at three inter-
related levels. The first of these concerns establishing the principle and 
practice of civilian control over the intelligence agencies. The second 
involves consolidating the democratic nature of this control through the 
establishment of mechanisms for oversight and scrutiny of the agencies’ 
activities, and developing relevant expertise and capacities to support these 
activities. The final level concerns organizational reform in the agencies 
themselves, reorientating and reorganizing for their new roles, and 
eliminating the most corrosive legacies of the past.15  
Finally, the need to develop principles and practices that make intelligence agencies 
much more effective while strengthening and stimulating democratic control and oversight 
are public interest, civilian expertise, institutionalization of processes, political culture, and 
the professionalization of intelligence services.16 In the same context, Cristiana Matei and 
Thomas C. Bruneau highlight the factors that can serve as motivation and that support 
progress when democratizing intelligence in the new democracies. These factors include 
the 
willingness of the political decision-makers to foster intelligence reform 
and achieve a balance between effectiveness and transparency; the role and 
influence of the foreign assistance; awareness of emerging security threats 
of the twenty-first century and thus the need for increased cooperation and 
intelligence sharing; and the role of the civil society and the media in 
advancing democratic reform of the intelligence.17  
Conversely, Matei and Bruneau point out the most important factors that can stop 
the progress of the democratization of intelligence in the new democracies are 
the complexity of reform itself; legacies of the authoritarian regime 
impeding the democratic reform process; resistance and reluctance to 
reform by the intelligence services; lack of expertise by civilians; lack of 
support for intelligence and intelligence culture among intelligence 
outsiders; corruption and organized crime; and, at least hypothetically, the 
threat of overall democratic regress. All these have negative impact on both 
                                                 
15 Timothy Edmunds, “Intelligence Agencies and Democratization, Continuity and Change in Serbia 
after Milošević,” Europe-Asia Studies 60, no. 1 (January 2008): 30, https://doi.org/10.1080/
09668130701760315. 
16 Edmunds, 36. 
17 Bruneau and Matei, “Intelligence Reform in New Democracies,” 615. 
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effectiveness and transparency of the newly created, or reformed, 
intelligence systems.18  
In the same vein, Thomas C. Bruneau and Kenneth R. Dombroski point out major 
challenges regarding democratic control in new democracies during reform; they discuss 
the issue of controlling the intelligence services in the area of civilian control of the armed 
forces as a subset of civil-military relations. Bruneau and Dombroski point that, “this is 
due not only to the legacies of the prior, non-democratic regimes, in which the intelligence 
or security apparatus was a key element of control, and in which human rights abuses often 
were allowed, but also to the inherent tension everywhere between intelligence and 
democracy.”19 They mention that these constraints—secrecy—related to the operations 
carried out by the intelligence services obstruct the democracy, which requires the 
responsibility of the governors toward the governed, and transparency.20 They add that 
intelligence services, to be effective, must operate in secrecy sometimes violating 
accountability and transparency.21 “While well-established democracies have developed 
mechanisms to deal with this dilemma, new democracies are still in the process of creating 
them.”22 
Furthermore, Loch K. Johnson, a leading intelligence expert, argues that for the 
new democracies to consolidate, free and fair elections, the establishment of an economic 
market, and the creation of a civil society are not enough. Moreover, Johnson declares that 
transforming intelligence services from repressive security apparatus into an effective and 
transparent democratic community remain a prerequisite.23 However, he notes that there 
are challenges ahead of the new intelligence agencies that are generally confronted with 
                                                 
18 Bruneau and Matei, 607. 
19 Thomas C. Bruneau and Kenneth R. Dombroski, “Reforming Intelligence, The Challenge Of 
Control In New Democracies” (Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) Publications, 2014), 2-3, 
https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/41971. 
20 Bruneau and Dombroski. 
21 Bruneau and Dombroski. 
22 Bruneau and Dombroski. 
23 Johnson, Secret Agencies, xviii. 
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• the inheritance of the undemocratic system 
• the lack of professionalism 
• the transitional government’s lack of experience in the conduct of 
intelligence reform 
• the autonomy therefore possessed by the military because of the monopoly 
they enjoyed during the undemocratic regime24  
The transformation of intelligence is a difficult process to accomplish, but not 
insurmountable. The challenges remain are achieving transparency and efficiency. 
Subsequently, Johnson mentions that if the will to change and the existence of strong 
external motivation is there, the redefinition of intelligence could succeed. He cites that, in 
essence, the paths leading to the reformation are twofold: democratic consolidation on the 
one hand and a contemporary security environment on the other. For Johnson, the 
transformation focuses on making intelligence accountable, accessible, and transparent 
while encompassing the creation of a new intelligence system, the establishment of a new 
legal framework, and subjugating them under democratic control.25  
3. On Intelligence Democratization in Post-Coup Mali 
The literature on Mali’s intelligence is rather sparse and mostly highlights the lack 
of intelligence democratization in the country. Michael Shurkin, Stephanie Pezard, and 
S. Rebecca Zimmerman note the current state of decay of Malian state apparatus, as well 
as the causes that led to the multi-dimensional crisis that rages in the country, south of the 
Sahel.26 Matei reveals notorious inadequacies related to the democratic control of the 
armed and security forces including the intelligence community (IC), as well as the lack of 
                                                 
24 Johnson. 
25 Loch K. Johnson, Strategic Intelligence: Understanding the Hidden Side of Government (Westport, 
CT: Praeger, 2007). 
26 Michael Shurkin, Stephanie Pezard, and S. Rebecca Zimmerman. Mali’s Next Battle: Improving 
Counterterrorism Capabilities. Rand Corporation, 2017. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/
research_reports/RR1200/RR1241/RAND_RR1241.pdf. 
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capabilities of the forces to face the threats.27 These authors decry that Mali only has 
human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities.28 They add that the modern equipment held 
by the international forces in place in Mali is envied by the ranks of the Malian security 
forces, which underestimate the HUMINT that represents an important part in the 
operations against terrorists.29  
D. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
I hypothesize that Mali is facing several challenges associated to democratic reform 
of intelligence, such as democratic consolidation, which is reflected in democratic civilian 
control of armed forces and security forces, Islamist extremism, and “stateness”30 as well 
as civil-military relations. These issues are connected to endemic corruption, poverty, and 
weak state apparatus. All these challenges are exacerbated by the inability for Mali, prior 
to the 2012 coup, to change the form of secret state-security apparatus, despite two decades 
of democratization.31 Subsequently, an outdated intelligence apparatus in addition to 
fragile civil-military relations in Mali significantly obstructed the country in its move to 
democratic consolidation, allowing this vicious cycle of coup d’état to happen again.  
The inability of some democracies to build strong institutions today presents a 
major challenge. These young democracies, most of them ethnically fragmented, face 
serious institutionalization problems that they struggle to overcome. They are often 
characterized by insider and outsider tensions that are difficult to resolve. In such societies, 
                                                 
27 Shemella and Tomb, Security Forces in African States, 115.  
28 Shemella and Tomb.  
29 Shemella and Tomb. 
30 Linz and Stepan, in their book on the problems of democratic transition and consolidation, define 
“stateness” in the five arenas of a consolidated democracy as one of the criteria for consolidating 
democracy. They claim that democracy is a form of state governance. As a prerequisite for the existence of 
a consolidated democracy, Linz and Stepan argue that a state must exist. They further assert that the 
absence of state—stateness—or the envy of a large section of the population, do not recognize themselves 
to the state and want to create a state or join another are major security issues that are often difficult to 
resolve. Juan J. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition And Consolidation: 
Southern Europe, South America, And Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1996), 7. 
31 Roy Pateman, “Intelligence Agencies In Africa: A Preliminary Assessment,” Journal of Modern 
African Studies 30, no. 4 (December 1992): 569-585, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X00011058.  
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insiders (i.e., the dominant ethnic group) centralize political power at a time when outsiders 
have no alternative but to try to overthrow the regime. For example in Mali, the Tuareg 
issue as well as other ethnic tensions are a major source of political instability.32 
Unfortunately, these tensions have not been adequately addressed by democratic 
institutions or resolved peacefully. My hypothesis is that if Mali is still struggling to find 
an adequate solution to this threat that has lasted for more than fifty years, it is because 
policymakers do not have in their possession reliable decision-making tools, including 
effective intelligence agencies, serving and supporting policymakers while fulfilling their 
roles such as analyzing and disseminating specific information.33  
Intelligence services are crucial in such processes. While intelligence serves as a 
forerunner against all threats, whether internal or external, it is important for decision-
makers to be at the leading edge of information, allowing them to assess the current and 
future security contexts at their true value. Good intelligence would undeniably help them 
make appropriate judgments pertaining to national security and external relations. Today, 
Mali has the State Security General Directorate (DGSE), which tends to dominate the other 
two agencies—the Directorate of Military Security and the General Intelligence of the 
Directorate of the National Police. The DGSE, with more than 80 percent of its work force 
being military personnel, has been headed only once by a civilian since its creation in 1989. 
It is therefore important for policymakers to proceed with the reform of the IC by creating 
or reorganizing intelligence structures, leading not only to a more equitable distribution of 
roles but also to the missions devolved to all intelligence services. This measure would 
allow for a balance between domestic and foreign intelligence, both civilian and military, 
as well as national defense and state authority. The creation of these new structures should 
take into account a legal framework that covers all the inadequacies related to legislation 
                                                 
32 Mali inherited the Tuaregs irredentism in the first years of its independence in 1960. The Tuaregs 
under the colonial era had always enjoyed autonomy in managing their tribes. After colonization, the 
country’s founding fathers had opted for the constitution of a nation-state, producing an effect contrary to 
the type of management wanted and in force in the nomadic Tuareg areas. As a result, Tuareg rebellions 
were successively raised (1963, 1990, 1995, 2006, 2012) against the central state, endangering the very 
existence of Mali. 
33 Based on Bruneau and Matei, “Intelligence Reform in New Democracies,” 602. 
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so that the intelligence services have roles and missions, reflecting those functioning in 
democracy. 
I also posit that Mali must undertake the following reforms to ensure intelligence 
effectiveness without jeopardizing the process of democratization: develop standards, 
procedures, and mechanisms that allow for democratic and civil control as well as the 
supervision of intelligence services; promote expertise and capabilities for more effective 
intelligence agencies; and institutionalize specific educational and training requirements as 
well as the transparency and cooperation of intelligence services when engaging reforms.  
Finally, I hypothesize that Mali must make its intelligence apparatus accountable 
to the citizens by developing strong institutions and mechanisms for control and oversight. 
These institutions include the executive (ministries in charge of intelligence, heads of 
intelligence agencies etc.); the legislative (committees); and the judicial (inspectors 
general). This thesis examines all the institutional incentives that can lead to the 
intelligence effectiveness at both domestic and international levels (non-government 
organizations [NGO], free press, and international organizations).34 My hypothesis is that 
through these institutions, new principles and practices can be developed to improve the 
intelligence services’ effectiveness. It is clear that the institutionalization of procedures that 
provide a legal framework for transparency and efficiency, as well as the availability of 
civilian experts, are essentials that contribute to strengthening democratic control and 
oversight. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The thesis seeks, first of all, to identify the challenges that Mali may encounter by 
initiating the democratization of intelligence agencies. Second, it aspires to identify and 
advance a successful model of democratic reform of intelligence. Finally, this thesis aims 
to assess the challenges and necessary reforms that policymakers in Mali must undertake 
in regard to its intelligence agencies based on case studies and lessons learned, to ensure 
                                                 
34 Florina Cristiana Matei and Thomas C. Bruneau, “Policymakers and Intelligence Reform in the 
New Democracies,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence 24, no. 4 (December 
2011): 660, https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2011.598784. 
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that Mali’s return to democracy benefits from transparent and effective intelligence 
services. The thesis further examines the models of two countries—Romania and Spain—
on which Malian’s policymakers can rely in building an effective democratic intelligence 
apparatus under civilian control.  
Therefore, the primary sources used are documents of governmental and non-
governmental institutions as well as the works of scholars with deep insight into the field 
of security sector governance, such as government of Mali website, U.S. Department of 
State, RAND Corporation, DCAF, the National Democratic Institute, European Union 
Training Mission, and United Nation Mission in Mali. The thesis also uses such secondary 
sources as media reports as well as others experts’ examinations of democratizing 
intelligence.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis is composed of four chapters, with Chapter I as the introduction. 
Chapter II examines the historical background of Mali’s reform of intelligence, from 1991 
to date, and the reasons why all attempts failed as well as the lack of incentives (threats, 
political will or policymakers lack of expertise etc.). Chapter III provides a comparative 
analysis between Romania’s and Spain’s respective roads to democracy. It highlights and 
the processes undertaken to obtain the transformation needed to meet the democratic 
principles, upon which Mali can develop its own democratic reform of intelligence. 
Romania and Spain today have proven to have achieved effective intelligence agencies. 
Chapter IV analyzes Mali and other cases to find an adequate answer to the research 
question while testing the hypotheses. It also offers conclusions and recommendations for 
the development of an effective intelligence agencies under democratic civilian control and 
contributing to enhance global security. 
12 
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF MALI’S INTELLIGENCE 
REFORM SINCE 1991 
A coup d’état perpetrated on March 26, 1991, by Lieutenant-Colonel Amadou 
Toumani Touré against Moussa Traoré’s military regime (1968-1991) marks the beginning 
of the democratic transition of Mali. In 1992, the first democratically elected president, 
Alpha Oumar Konaré, inaugurated the democratic era. However, the government did not 
seize this opportunity to initiate the necessary reforms for the consolidation of democracy 
through civil-military relations, specifically between leaders and intelligence services—
tools necessary for political decision-makers for democratic consolidation. Instead, the 
newly elected authorities relegated the institutions in charge of intelligence services to the 
background, whether because of ignorance, poor knowledge or understanding of the 
country’s security challenges, or a lack of political will that could be motivated by personal 
reasons and external incentives. This neglect hampered the necessary democratic reform 
of intelligence, contributing in turn to grave security consequences that Mali has faced 
since 2012.  
For more than half a century, security issues in Mali have been perceived as 
challenges for the armed forces and security forces alone. Nevertheless, timid attempts by 
the democratic government to reform the defense and security forces were initiated 
successively between 1997 and 2012; the restructuring focused on the defense and security 
forces as a whole, without necessarily specifying the intelligence services. In the aftermath 
of the 2012 crisis, however, a number of minor reforms were initiated within the 
intelligence community to address the country’s multiple challenges—armed rebel groups 
and terrorism, as well as economic, social, and political struggles—and the inherent 
weaknesses in the functioning of intelligence services. This approach focused on the 
internal restructuring of the Military Intelligence Directorate, through the creation of an 
internal fusion unit at regional and central levels and then the creation of an ad-hoc fusion 
center of the intelligence community. This chapter examines the Malian intelligence 
community and concludes that, despite some attempts to reform the intelligence services, 
14 
the country is in dire need of deep democratic reform of its intelligence services; a balance 
between democratic civilian control and effectiveness.35 
A. MALI’S CURRENT INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
In Mali, there are currently three main intelligence services: the State Security 
General Directorate,36 the Directorate of Military Security37 (DSM), and the General 
Intelligence and Territory Surveillance Directorate of the National Police38 as well as an 
Intelligence Analysis and Fusion Center, created in March 2017.39 The main tasks of the 
intelligence services are the collection, management, analysis, and dissemination of 
intelligence to policymakers.  
Today, these intelligence agencies report to the President of the Republic, the 
Minister of Defense, and to the Minister of Security and Civil Protection (General 
Intelligence and Territory Surveillance Directorate of the National Police, and Intelligence 
Analysis and Fusion Center). The organizational chart, in Figure 1, illustrates the 
intelligence community in Mali as a whole, as well as its link and level of strategic and 
operational intervention. 
                                                 
35 Bruneau and Matei, “Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-military 
Relations,” 921-923. 
36 Ordonnance n°89-18/P-RM du 1er Mars 1989 Portant Création de la Direction Générale de la 
Sécurité d’Etat. [State Security General Directorate Act of 1989, Pub. L No. 89-18 / P-RM (1989)]. 
http://sgg-mali.ml/JO/1989/mali-jo-1989-05.pdf. 
37 Loi n°095-38/ du 20 Avril 1995 portant création de la Direction de la Sécurité Militaire. 
[Directorate of Military Security Act of 1995, No. 095-38 (1995)]. http://sgg-mali.ml/JO/1995/mali-jo-
1995-10.pdf 
38 Loi n°05-020/AN-RM du 30 mai 2005 portant ratification de l’ordonnance n°04-026/P-RM du 16 
septembre 2004 portant création de la Direction Générale de la police nationale. [General Directorate of the 
National Police Act of 2005, Pub. L No. 05-020/AN-RM (2005) ratifying Act of 2004, Pub. L No. 04-026 / 
P-RM (2004)]. http://sgg-mali.ml/JO/2005/mali-jo-2005-19.pdf 
39 Arrêté n°2017-0505/MSPC-SG du 7 mars 2017 portant création, composition et fonctionnement du 




Figure 1. Malian Intelligence Community Organizational Chart40 
1. The Presidency Intelligence Service 
The presidency is one of the institutions that possess an intelligence agency. The 
DGSE is the main intelligence service of Mali. In Mali there is no proper intelligence fusion 
structure at the national level. The fusion center housed in the Ministry of Security and 
Civil Protection is more like an ad-hoc structure than permanent, because it is mainly 
composed of representatives of several structures other than those in charge of intelligence. 
The DGSE was born from the ashes of the State Security Service created by Law No. 02-
10 of January 1962. In January 1989, Law No. 89-18 / AN-RM created the DGSE.41 This 
law stipulates that “the DGSE is a public service whose mission is the protection of the 
institutions of Republic of Mali, including the monitoring of all the activities that take in 
                                                 
40 “G2” stands for military intelligence at the headquarter level (General Staff or branches such as 
Army or Air-force). 
41 Ordonnance n°89-18/P-RM. 
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the country, and by gathering all the information, and all the intelligence on the political, 
economic, social, cultural, military and scientific life of the country.”42 In addition, the law 
mentions that the activities of the DGSE are carried out both inside and outside the national 
territory.43 Moreover, it specifies that in compliance with the laws in vigor, the DGSE 
agents have the right of access in all public and private institutions and cannot be refused 
the communication of any document, file, or testimony.44 The DGSE is headed by a 
Director General appointed by decree of the President of the Republic and is assisted by a 
Deputy Director appointed under the same conditions.45 
Presidential Decree No. 89-0114/P-RM, dated April 30, 1989, sets the general 
organizational framework of the DGSE.46 It stipulates that the DGSE functions under the 
direct authority of the President of the Republic; comprises departments at the central level 
and branches abroad; and is supported by a staff (permanent and temporary) comprised of 
civil and military.47 The decree also includes career path requirements for the DGSE 
personnel, including promotions and disciplinary actions, education, training and the 
like.48  
In June 1992, Decree No. 92-012/P-RM, issued by the first democratically elected 
president, Alpha Oumar Konaré, placed DGSE directly under the President of the Republic. 
                                                 
42 Ordonnance n°89-18/P-RM.  
43 Ordonnance n°89-18/P-RM.  
44 Ordonnance n°89-18/P-RM.  
45 Ordonnance n°89-18/P-RM. 
46 Décret n°89-0114/P-RM du 22 Avril 1989 fixant le cadre général de l’organisation de la Direction 
Générale de la Sécurité d’Etat. [Exec. Order No. 89-0114/P-RM (1989)]. http://sgg-mali.ml/JO/1989/mali-
jo-1989-08.pdf. 
47 However, recruiting at the DGSE is only at the request of the Director of the DGSE among the 
agents (category A, B, C) of the civil service and military placed as the Presidency personnel to serve the 
DGSE) Hence, the agents admitted to perform at the DGSE are sworn in before taking office and benefit 
from the settlements provided by the regulations (risk premium, special duty bonus, personal and residence 
allowance, etc.). Décret n°89-0114. 
48 The Director of the State Security General Directorate is responsible for the study of all matters 
relating to the organization and operation of the service; budget preparation; recruitment, training, and 
education of staff; management of personnel, equipment, and credits; the coordination of the different 
departments of the service; the preparation of summary reports on all aspects of the life of the nation; the 
transmission to the Government of all information collected; the organization of periodic meetings with the 
staff of the service. Décret n°89-0114. 
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While there had been some other decrees placing it under the Prime Minister (Decree No. 
93-009/P-RM of January 1993),49 it currently functions under the direct authority of the 
President (Decree No. 016-0863/P-RM of November 2016).50 
The DGSE was reorganized once more in 2014 and has received significant funds, 
but unfortunately, no documents are available to assess the reform undertaken.51 As such, 
in February 2015, the DGSE received $3 million in special interest accounts. This special 
authority was established by Order 2015-0040 / MEF-SG of February 2015 by the Ministry 
of Finance.52 Its purpose is real-time cash payment for specific expenses, for the agency 
staff allowances, day to day operations and other expenses.53 DGSE reportedly benefits 
more in terms of budget, equipment, and personnel than any other intelligence service.54 
However, the structure escapes not only to the civilian control of government branches but 
also to the judicial and legislative oversight. These shortcomings mean that the DGSE, as 
well as its counterparts in the Ministry of Defense and Security, do not contribute 
effectively to the consolidation of Malian democracy. 
2. Ministry of Defense and Veterans Affairs 
The Directorate of Military Security—in charge of military intelligence, is housed 
in the Ministry of Defense and reports to the Department Minister. The Directorate of 
Military Security, although having undergone a slight restructuring to respond the terrorist 
                                                 
49 This new reorganization led to the amendment of Exec. Order No. 89-0114/P-RM. In so doing, 
Articles 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7 of the Exec. Order were amended replacing the President of the Republic by the 
Prime Minister. http://sgg-mali.ml/JO/1993/mali-jo-1993-02.pdf. 
50 Décret n°2016-0864/P-RM fixant l’organisation de la Présidence de la République [Exec. Order 
No. 2016-0864/P-RM (2016).], http://sgg-mali.ml/JO/2016/mali-jo-2016-49.pdf. 
51 A. Coulibaly, “Mali. : Assemblée Nationale, La Commission Défense et Sécurité reçoit le patron de 
la Sécurité militaire” le Malien, 22 Février 2016. [National Assembly, Defense and Security Commission 
receives the patron of Military Security, Malian, February 22, 2016.], http://maliactu.net/mali-assemblee-
nationale-la-commission-defense-et-securite-recoit-le-patron-de-la-securite-militaire/. 
52 Arrêté N°2015-0040/MEF-SG du 04 Février 2015 Portant Institution d’une Régie Spéciale 
d’Avances à la Direction Générale de la Sécurité d’Etat. [Order 2015-0040/MEF-SG (2015)], http://sgg-
mali.ml/JO/2016/mali-jo-2016-11.pdf. 
53 Arrêté N°2015-0040/MEF-SG. 
54 Coulibaly. “Mali.” 
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threat55 in the aftermath of the coup, is not immune to the same shortcomings faced by 
other intelligence services.” 
a. Directorate of Military Security 
The DSM, created in April 1995 by Law No. 95-038, is the structure in charge of 
military intelligence within the armed forces. DSM’s mission is the development and 
implementation of the National Military Intelligence Policy. Thereby, its main roles are to 
prepare the intelligence requirements plans of the Department of the Armed Forces; search, 
centralize, exploit, and synthesize military intelligence as well as those transmitted by other 
sources or intelligence services; coordinate the action of the various sources of military 
intelligence and prepare comprehensive documentation of the various threats; and 
participate in the implementation of the provisions relating to the prevention of the illicit 
trade in war materials, arms, and ammunition.56  
Presidential Decree No. 95-251 of June 1995 establishes the organization and 
functioning of the Directorate of Military Security. This decree stipulates that the DSM is 
placed under the Minister of Defense direct authority.57 The document organizes the DSM 
into several divisions including the research, prevention, and protection division; the 
technical division; as well as an administrative center, a general, and personal secretariat 
to the director.58 Order No. 97-006/MFAAC-SG sets out the details of the organization 
                                                 
55 In September 2014, a restructuring within the Directorate of Military Security was authorized, 
through a directive relating to the creation and use of intelligence cells, by the Chief of General Staff of the 
Armed Forces. This reorganization took place in a context of instability in the Sahelo-Saharan region and 
the complexity of the threat posed by terrorist and insurgent groups; trafficking and organized crime, the 
document states. These cells are resolutely involved in researching and rapidly disseminating information 
to authorities at all levels by identifying factors of hostility toward the forces; identifying potential menace; 
and analyzing these threats, and providing the intelligence to carry out appropriate actions against them. 
Directive relative à la création et à l’emploi des cellules de renseignement n°00136/DSM du 15 Septembre 
2014. [Directorate of Military Security, Directive on the creation and use of Intelligence Units, DSM No. 
00136/DSM. Bamako, Mali 2014]. 
56 Loi n°095-38. 
57 Décret n°95-251/P-RM du 30 Juin 1995 fixant l’organisation et les modalités de fonctionnement de 
la Direction de la Sécurité Militaire. [Exec. Order No. 95-251/P-RM (1995)], http://sgg-mali.ml/JO/1995/
mali-jo-1995-10.pdf.  
58 Décret n°95-251/P-RM. 
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and operating procedures of the DSM.59 In its articles (2, 3, 4, and 5), the order provides 
for finance and general administration sections.60 Whereas the finance section is 
responsible for the preparation of the budget and its execution, the general administration 
section is in charge of the management of the military and civilian personnel.61  
The DSM’ is made up of military seconded by other armies such as the Army, Air 
Force, Gendarmerie, and National Guard. Their career plans depend administratively on 
their original organization.62 The Directorate of Military Security works in close 
collaboration with the intelligence structures placed at the various levels of military 
command, such as the documentation division at the level of the General Staff of the Armed 
Forces, the military intelligence offices (G2) at the level of staffs and services (Army, Air 
Force, Gendarmerie, National Guard etc.), and intelligence cells in defense zones and air 
bases.63 
One of the most recent reforms of the Directorate of Military Security took place 
in 2014, in the wake of the 2012 crisis. The aim of this reform was to respond effectively 
to the need for territorial networking as well as the coordination and revitalization of an 
integrated intelligence chain for the success of military operations. In this vein, intelligence 
cells in charge of merging and analyzing the data were created. The Analysis and Fusion 
Cells (AFC)64 are permanent structures commissioned by the Director of Military 
Intelligence. These cells, led by DSM personnel, gather daily with representatives of other 
intelligence services on the theater of operations. Accordingly, the cells of analysis and 
                                                 
59 Order No. 99-006/MFAAC-SG setting out the details of the organization and operating procedures 
of the Directorate of Military Security. “Arrêté n°97-006/MFAAC-SG du 29 Janvier 1997 fixant les détails 
de l’organisation et les modalités de fonctionnement de la Direction de la Sécurité Militaire.” 
60 Décret n°95-251/P-RM. 
61 Décret n°95-251/P-RM 
62 Décret n° 2013-4751/MDAC-SG Portant Détachement d’Officier à la Direction de la Sécurité 
Militaire. [Exec. Order No. 2013-4751/MDAC-SG (2013).], http://sgg-mali.ml/JO/2014/mali-jo-2014-
39.pdf, http://sgg-mali.ml/JO/2015/mali-jo-2015-42.pdf. 
63 The intelligence offices in the General Staffs and certain services-Army, Air Force, Gendarmerie, 
National Guard, etc.-operate under the G2 operations cells [Exec. Order No. 365-366/P-RM (1999)]. They 
are an integral part of these G2 cells whose mission is to organize the research and dissemination of 
intelligence, http://sgg-mali.ml/JO/1999/mali-jo-1999-33.pdf. 
64 DSM n°00136. 
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fusion are organized in three levels: central, zonal, and sector. These AFCs may be split up 
to the Combined Arms Group (GTIA) level, which has an S265 composed of an officer, a 
noncommissioned officer, and two enlisted.66 The organizational chart in Figure 2 
illustrates the different levels of intervention of the military intelligence component. 
 
Figure 2. Military Intelligence Reporting Channel 
An embryonic interagency coordination between ministerial intelligence services—
defense and security—in addition to other departments and international partners, exists 
today, but could be strengthened or restructured and elevate at a national level. 
3. Ministry of Security and Civil Protection 
The General Intelligence and Territorial Surveillance Directorate is a service within 
the General Directorate of the National Police—under the authority of the Ministry of 
                                                 
65 “S2” stands for the intelligence section at the tactical level (Battalion).  
































Security and created by Law No. 04-026/P-RM. This intelligence agency experienced 
several changes in the 1990s to 2000s, the last transformation occurring in October 2004, 
under Decree No. 04-470/P-RM by the council of ministers. The General Intelligence and 
Territorial Surveillance Directorate is responsible for 
• the search, centralization, and exploitation of all kinds of intelligence 
necessary for government information 
• the coordination of the intelligence activity at the level of all the police 
services 
• the surveillance of foreigners’ activities67  
The General Intelligence and Territorial Surveillance Directorate comprises several 
divisions in charge of political, social, and cultural issues; economic; territory monitoring; 
documentation; and technical services. 
In addition, the Ministry of Security houses the brand-new Center for Analysis and 
Fusion of Intelligence, created by Order No. 2017-0505/MSPC.68 The Intelligence 
Analysis and Fusion Center is responsible for collecting and analyzing intelligence from 
national services and partners to facilitate decision-making. As such, it is composed of a 
permanent head of a center, a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Police, 
the Gendarmerie, National Guard, Civil Protection, DGSE, DSM, the General Directorate 
of Water and Forests, and the General Directorate of Customs as well as a representative 
of the EUCAP Sahel Mali Mission, and MUNISMA on a temporary basis. The center meets 
at least once a week—or more often if necessary. However, in June 2017, the Order was 
amended by Order No. 2017-1843/MSPC-SG,69 which added a representative of the 
Central Office of Narcotic Drugs to the composition of the center on a permanent basis.  
                                                 
67 Décret n°04-470/P-RM du 20 octobre 2004 fixant l’organisation et les modalités de fonctionnement 
de la Direction Générale de la Police Nationale. [Exec. Order No. 04-470/P-RM (2004)], http://sgg-
mali.ml/JO/2005/mali-jo-2005-05.pdf. 
68 Arrêté n°2017-0505.  
69 Arrêté n°2017-1843. 
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B. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MALIAN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES  
Only the General Directorate of State Security and the Military Intelligence Service 
have both intelligence and counterintelligence functions. Although Mali has a solid 
framework of statutory regulations for intelligence institutions, roles, and missions, in 
addition to a budget for intelligence, it seems that in Mali, the intelligence community is 
struggling to deal effectively with the threats that the country faces after more than two 
decades of democratic experience. Intelligence in Mali has lost credibility not only inside 
but also outside the country. As an illustration, despite the information obtained by the 
DGSE on both sides—by their counterpart of Algeria (Department of Intelligence and 
Security [DRS]) and its informants in within the Tuareg community on a potential rebellion 
in the northern part of the country—the DGSE and the two other intelligence agencies 
(DSM and DGRG), failed to assess the threat that led to Malian state disruption in 2012. 
This failure provides ample evidence that the intelligence services in Mali needed to be 
rebuilt.70 
The Malian intelligence services have in the past maintained close relations with 
their French, German, and American counterparts. Relations with the latter, through the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), go back to the 1990s and 2000s, in the context of the 
war against terrorism and drug trafficking transiting through northern Mali. The 
unorthodox practices of the intelligence services pushed the CIA, which has a significant 
representation in Bamako, to be wary of the IC.71 The nature of the operations carried out 
by the DGSE—countering Tuareg rebellions, terrorism, traffickers, and bandits—was a 
catalyst for the involvement of the department’s personnel in networks of dirty money, 
corruption, and criminal complicity.72 For example, a senior officer was killed by al-Qaeda 
                                                 





in the Islamic Maghreb in 2011 because he was suspected of being in league with the 
terrorists.73  
In addition, if Mali had an effective intelligence service, there would have been no 
negative consequences during the protests against the Code de la Famille74 or the outcome 
of the Mali-Togo soccer game in 2011,75 which caused violent protests in the Malian 
capital of Bamako.  
Interagency IC in Mali is difficult to achieve. The legal vacuum with regard to the 
intelligence services considerably hinders the necessary synergy of action that these 
structures must undertake. The reporting channels of each intelligence service, a stove-pipe 
system, speaks volumes about the nature of cooperation between the major intelligence 
agencies.  
C. MECHANISMS FOR INSTITUTIONAL CONTROL AND OVERSIGHT 
Democratic control and oversight of Mali’s intelligence agencies—exercised by the 
executive and legislative branches of the government, as well as by the intelligence services 
themselves—exists on paper.  
                                                 
73 Jeune Afrique. “Politique Mali: Meurtres au Sahel,” 23 juin 2009, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/
202753/politique/meurtres-au-sahel/. 
74 In August 2009, the National Assembly largely adopted a new family code designed to create 
equality between men and women in terms of inheritance rights. The adoption of this new “Family and 
People Code” in Mali provoked serious protests from leaders and young Muslims who vowed to prevent 
this code from being enacted. 
75 The Africa Cup of Nations playoff game between Mali and Togo, in which Mali was defeated, was 
the event that triggered the debate on security sector reform. That day, young people unhappy with the 
defeat of the national football team turned into hooligans, attacking peaceful citizens in the capital, in front 
of security forces unable to control them. As a result, sanctions were imposed on security forces including 
intelligence services heads, while civil society demanded the establishment of a strong state authority. 
Subsequently, national meetings were held in all regions of the country. In the end, recommendations were 
made to require good governance of the security sector. Zeïni Moulaye and IGP Mahamadou Niakaté, 
Shared Governance of Peace and Security: The Malian Experience (Bamako: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 
2011), 5-10. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/nigeria/08972.pdf. 
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1. Oversight and Its Discontents 
Executive control involves direction and guidance by the President, the Prime 
Minister, and the ministries in charge of intelligence agencies—the Ministry of Defense 
and the Ministry of Internal Security and Civil Protection. What remains controversial is 
the blurring of shared responsibilities between the president as a commander in chief, the 
prime minister in charge of implementing the national defense policy, the Supreme Defense 
Council, which operates occasionally, and the other ministries in charge of intelligence 
domain.  
Legislative control and oversight in Mali is exercised by the National Assembly’s 
Defense and Security Committee. In practice, it is less than perfect. Essentially, the 
legislature does not have any control over the security force’s budget, where a system of 
checks and balances must be considered and fully implemented for more transparency. 
Also, a constitutional vacuum exists in the legislative control and oversight of the 
intelligence services.76 This gap reflects the lack of expertise and importance given to the 
intelligence agencies, which remain fundamental to the consolidation of democracy. 
Although little research is available, it appears that, from the author’s observations, 
the judicial branch of the government has not fulfilled its roles in interceding and providing 
a legal framework in the Malian security sector. As a result, the few allocated resources for 
the security sectors, which are sufficient to be effective and efficient at a certain level, are 
inappropriately managed, due to the lack of control. The result of the judiciary failing to 
play its role has allowed the security forces to act independently. The aim is to avoid any 
conflict with the civil hierarchy and security actors and to prevent any legal institutions 
within the ministries in charge of security sectors from shedding light on cases of violation 
of laws. These institutions—Inspector General and Military Justice—have been 
undermined intentionally to make them ineffective for decades. 
                                                 
76 While there is a Parliamentary Committee in charge of defense and security issues, there is no 
standing committee specifically dedicated to intelligence services to oversee operations, budget or DGSE 




In addition, the informal oversight of the intelligence agencies in Mali by media 
and civil society has been faulty. At a minimum, the media has only occasionally reported 
on wrongdoing or ineffectiveness of the intelligence sector in preventing security threats. 
Still, there have been instances in which media reports have elicited no meaningful 
government response. For example in 2013, TV5 Monde, a French television channel, 
noted the kidnapping and forcible confinement of a member of the Malian National 
Assembly—an opposition party leader, in fact—by the DGSE.77 The victim lodged a 
complaint with the Supreme Court against the intelligence service. The representative 
stated that he was brutally arrested in the offices of the NGO he runs because of his 
relationship with the Red Berets (the presidential guard under Amadou Toumani Touré) 
and his interactions with the Islamists who had controlled the northern regions of Mali.78  
Recently, the journal le Sphinx reported on the disappearance of a journalist, which 
involved a senior dignitary of the National Assembly and a senior officer of the DGSE.79 
This case, dating back to January 2017, was reported after two years of investigation and 
accused the so-called dignitaries of contributing to the disappearance of the journalist. 
Unfortunately, the journalist had died during the nine months of illegal detention. No legal 
action has yet been filed either against the alleged accused or the DGSE.80 
2. Assessing Malian Intelligence 
In light of Bruneau and Matei’s criteria, it appears that Malian intelligence 
agencies’ civilian control and effectiveness remain weak, as shown in Table 1. 
                                                 
77 Jeune Afrique, “Politique Mali: Un Homme Politique Porte Plainte Contre les Services de 
Renseignement, AFP.” [A Politician Complains Against the Intelligence Service, AFP]. March 25, 2013.], 
http://www.jeuneafrique.com/depeches/37943/politique/mali-un-homme-politique-porte-plainte-contre-les-
services-de-renseignement/. 
78 Jeune Afrique. 
79 Jeune Afrique. 
80 Maliactu. “Mali: Des Révélations sur la Disparition d’un Journaliste d’Investigation,” [Revelations 
about the disappearance of an investigative journalist], Journal Le Sphinx du 25 Juillet 2018. 
https://maliactu.net/mali-des-revelations-sur-la-disparition-dun-journaliste-dinvestigation/. 
26 











Low Low Low Low Low Low 
 
The result for institutional control mechanisms in Mali is “low.” Although it is part 
of the legal framework, the institutional control mechanism of intelligence agencies has 
barely translated into reality. The worst effects of this lack of control are illustrated by the 
involvement of intelligence services in illegal activities—organized crime groups—as well 
as the unorthodox behavior of their personnel, such as cronyism and nepotism.81 
Disinformation practices are the focus of intelligence services, rather than national security 
intelligence. Meanwhile, Mali remains plagued by increasing insecurity in the north and 
central regions of the country, despite the help of partners in the re-founding of security 
forces (EUTM, EUCAP, MUNISMA, and the United States). 
Mali’s oversight category in requirements for control is also “low.” In Mali, there 
is no permanent parliamentary commission or judicial body with powers and 
responsibilities to oversee the IC in general, and in particular the operations, organization, 
budget, or activities of the DGSE, which reports only to the President of the Republic.82 A 
Parliamentary Defense and Security Committee exists in the National Assembly; however, 
no meaningful information is available on the monitoring or management of Malian 
national intelligence agencies in the public domain. The media on the other hand, as an 
informal watchdog, has repeatedly criticized the misuse of intelligence services and the 
lack of IC, without reaching significant results from policymakers, bringing about the 
entire IC reforms. Before the coup, Freedom House ranked media in Mali as fully free.83 
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In the professional norms classification, Mali still rates a “low” mark. The 
professionalization of intelligence agencies has to overcome major challenges. This 
assessment is due to the fact that there is a lack of a proper career plan for officers or other 
personnel serving in the intelligence services. “These personnel have yet to obtain the 
education, training and equipment necessary to perform the necessary bureaucratic tasks 
and expected operational missions,”84 said Matei. The fragile nature of civilian governance 
in Mali recommends adequate civilian oversight of intelligence services, as enshrined in 
the constitution. 
In terms of requirements for effectiveness, Mali’s score is “low” in the plan 
category. In Mali, while recent innovations in coordinating intelligence structures have 
been initiated, there are no strategic intelligence documents or doctrines that identify 
priorities and guidelines, aligned with resources. In contrast, the DGSE, for example, in its 
fight against terrorism, contributed to the arrest of several terrorists involved in the 
attacks—Terrasse85 and Grand Bassam86—of Bamako and Abidjan, despite the absence 
of a plan on the role and the place of intelligence services in Malian democracy. 
For efficiency requirements, the institutions category turns out also to be “low.” 
The post-2012 crisis has resulted in a timid re-foundation of intelligence structures at the 
strategic level. This restructuring has allowed the creation of such organizations such as 
the National Intelligence Council, though it remains inoperative today.87 More importantly, 
Mali does not have a civil intelligence agency as such. Also, the lack of a permanent and 
effective mechanism at the strategic level for intelligence structures obstructs the 
interoperability and effectiveness of these institutions. However, the creation of an 
                                                 
84 Shemella and Tomb, Security Forces in African States, 115. 
85 “Mali : L’Auteur Présumé des Attentats de La Terrasse à Bamako arrêté,” Ouest-France. 22 Avril 
2016, https://www.ouest-france.fr/monde/mali/mali-lauteur-presume-des-attentats-de-la-terrasse-bamako-
arrete-4179482. 
86 Jeune Afrique. “Sécurité Mali : Un des Organisateurs Présumés de l’Attaque de Grand-Bassam 
Arrêté, AFP.” [One of the Presumed Organizers of the Great-Bassam Attack Arrested,] AFP. January 12, 
2017, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/392251/politique/mali-arrestation-dun-organisatFeurs-presumes-de-
grand-bassam/. 
87 In fact, a National Intelligence Council has been created, but is struggling to function, certainly 
because of the rivalries between the existing intelligence services. Moreover, this council uniting the so-
called intelligence services had not met yet. Shurkin, Pezard, and Zimmerman. Mali’s Next Battle. 
28 
intelligence fusion center—an ad-hoc body—involving all national and international actors 
in the intelligence sector, represents signs of hope for a profound reform of the intelligence 
community.  
The allocation of resources to the intelligence sector shows, in principle, the interest 
the authorities have in this sector. Intelligence services in Mali are considered to be a 
privileged policy-making tool and are less well-off in terms of budget. With the exception 
of the DGSE, which enjoys its presidential status, benefiting from millions of dollars of 
funds,88 the DSM had a budget of $34,000 equivalent in the law of orientation (five years 
Planning-Programming-Budgeting) and military programming, extending over a period of 
five years.89 
Therefore, Mali’s intelligence services remain both ineffective and democratically 
uncontrolled despite the very few achievements in the fight against terrorism. To reverse 
the balance, policymakers must initiate the necessary reforms and translate the existing 
theoretical democratic civilian control and oversight into practice, enabling a rigorous code 
of ethics in the intelligence sector. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Mali has a long way to go in terms of reforming its institutions in general and its 
intelligence services in particular. Democratic governance—control and effectiveness—of 
intelligence services remains an important challenge to be addressed. While civil and 
democratic control exists legally through formal oversight—executive, legislative, and 
judicial mechanisms—actual oversight of the intelligence services remains virtually 
nonexistent, negatively affecting the performance of the intelligence community. Despite 
the various calls to reform the intelligence services—balancing transparency and 
effectiveness—before the events of March 2012, policymakers have remained 
unresponsive to this demand, which has potentially led to the multi-dimensional crisis that 
the country has been going through since 2012. The 2012 crisis that ended in a coup d’état 
                                                 
88 Coulibaly, “Mali.” 
89 Shurkin, Pezard, and Zimmerman. Mali’s Next Battle. 
29 
was a trigger for the timid reform undertaken in the aftermath of the re-democratization. 
Indeed, the state of degeneration of the security forces in general and the intelligence 
services in particular, decried by some scientists, sufficiently proves the lack of 
democratization of the intelligence services in the country. The authors Michael Shurkin, 
Stephanie Pezard, and Rebecca Zimmerman have irrefutably pointed out deficiencies in 
certain intelligence functions in Mali.90 These functions are mainly related to human 
intelligence (HUMINT)—a realm of intelligence that is underestimated by intelligence 
officers in Mali, who tend to favor aerial surveillance and signal intelligence (SIGINT) 
methods operated by the partners. As a result, Mali’s intelligence services remain both 
ineffective and democratically uncontrolled, given the ongoing challenges, particularly in 
terms of intelligence transparency vis-à-vis citizens and the fight against terrorism. 
Policymakers must undertake the necessary reforms to reverse this trend and translate into 
practice the theoretical democratization of existing institutions, thus enabling a rigorous 
code of ethics within the intelligence services. In the end, if Mali’s democratic 
consolidation is struggling to reach fruition after two decades of practice, it is because it 
has not initiated the necessary reform of the intelligence services. 
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III. INTELLIGENCE REFORM IN ROMANIA AND SPAIN  
Since Romania and Spain transitioned to democracy in 1989 and 1975, 
respectively, these two countries have undergone notable reforms of their intelligence 
apparatus as part of their wider processes of democratic consolidation. Both Romania and 
Spain have succeeded in establishing renowned intelligence agencies, serving as models 
within Europe and the rest of the world. These successes were made possible because of 
the involvement of all the components of society, namely the media (which played a 
leading role in Romania), civil society, as well as the political will of decision-makers in 
Spain, but especially the desire to integrate the European Union and the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), which required criteria for political, economic, and security 
membership.  
Nevertheless, the Romanian and Spanish paths to success were not without pitfalls. 
The consolidation of their democracies, even if they still face enormous challenges today, 
did not happen overnight. As such, the main obstacles facing these two countries are 
economic, internal conflicts, terrorist threats, as well as endemic corruption. The two 
countries were successively confronted with ethnic tensions, bringing a blow to the 
consolidation of their democracy. While Romanian democracy is facing its greatest crisis 
since 1990,91 Spain, meanwhile, continues to struggle with the separatists in Catalonia.92 
                                                 
91 Romanian democracy is facing one of the worst crisis in a decade. It was after an attempt to enact 
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For the latter, the nature of the threats—coup d’état, and stateness93 issues—that existed 
and continue to rage in this country, shows that democracy is a process that takes a long 
time to strengthen. As far as Romania is concerned, the extent of the protests, Bucharest 
against Romanian government since early 2017, prove to the fullest that there are many 
hard steps to go through in order to consolidate democracy. Therefore, these states make a 
good comparison to Mali because they are relatively new to the full-on democracy game, 
and the edges are still a little rough amid various domestic and regional tensions.  
This chapter compares and contrasts democratic reforms of intelligence in Romania 
and Spain after their transitions to democracy.  
A. BACKGROUND ON THE NON-DEMOCRATIC REGIMES AND 
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS IN ROMANIA AND SPAIN 
Romania (1965-1989) was a highly repressive Communist regime,94 while Spain 
(1936-1975) was a dictatorship regime.95 Both non-democratic regimes in Romania and 
Spain were characterized by exaggerated corruption, suppression of liberties, and other 
human rights abuses.96  
Romania and Spain, under their respective dictatorial regimes, have used their 
repressive intelligence agencies—the Securitate and the Central Service of Documentation 
(SECED)—to bolster their governments. These two intelligence agencies served as 
                                                 
93 Linz and Stepan, in their book on the problems of democratic transition and consolidation, define 
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political polices97 for Nicolae Ceausescu and, respectively, Francisco Franco. These 
intelligence services’ practices of internal and external espionage, physical torture, or 
imprisonment played decisive roles leading not only to creating an atmosphere of fear and 
intimidation but also an impression of suspicion and mistrust between these dictators and 
their people. In Spain, for example, the establishment of concentration camps with the help 
of SECED, resulted in the death of about 400,000 people.98 As a result, Romania and Spain 
both became surveillance states, creating psychological fear within the population through 
rumors or misinformation.99 
While Romania’s transition to democracy in 1989 was bloody, including the deaths 
of dictator Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife, Elena,100 General Francisco Franco’s death in 
1975 marked the beginning of a peaceful and democratic transition in Spain.101 
On their path to democratization, Romania and Spain established new democratic 
intelligence agencies under legal bases—rule of law, human rights, checks and balances—
and supported by monitoring and supervision mechanisms.102 Moreover, they also defined 
their new intelligence structures’ roles and missions based on their own security challenges 
and threats. 
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B. DEMOCRATIC REFORM OF INTELLIGENCE 
From the beginning, both Romania and Spain struggled in the transitional process 
of reforming their intelligence services. The legacy of their former intelligence agencies—
the Romanian Securitate, and Spain’s Central National Office103—have severely 
hampered their efforts to reach a compromise between intelligence effectiveness and 
democratic civilian control. On the one hand, these challenges were due to the population 
hostility toward the agents (from former repressive intelligence agencies) and institutions 
in charge of intelligence; and on the other hand, the lack of transparency and some 
fallacious legal malfunctions during the first years of the transformation. Over time, the 
efforts made on both sides have led to successes, favoring the democratization of the 
intelligence services, which is subject to the institutionalization of civilian democratic 
control and oversight, the modernization of personnel management (recruitment, 
education, and technical training), as well as the relationship between intelligence services 
and civil society. 
In general, media, European and Euro-Atlantic security institutions, as well as 
national security threats have been catalysts for intelligence reforms in both countries. The 
types of national security threats104 in the two countries have triggered reforms 
encompassing new effective and modern intelligence systems that could adequately 
address security challenges. In addition, such threats required intelligence services that 
have a legal framework, training, and enhanced education, allowing them to delineate 
criminal actions, understand unbalanced markets, promote growth and innovation, and 
control increased loss of sovereignty.105 The determining factors that have contributed to 
                                                 
103 Carlos Barrachina Lisón, “El regreso a los cuarteles: Militares y cambio político en España (1976-
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the transformation and democratization with regard to these countries—Romania and 
Spain—first and foremost, the desire to belong to the European Union through the 
integration into NATO. Second, there is the desire of state leaders (more prominent in 
Romania than in Spain) to obliterate the stigma left by the intelligence agencies, the role 
played by the media in calling secret services whenever necessary, the will of the civilian 
elite to reform the intelligence community in order to face such threats to the national 
security as terrorism. 
After several reforms undertaken in both countries, Romania comprises six 
intelligence agencies as opposed to that of Spain, which contains nearly a dozen bodies. 
Together, Romania and Spain have ministerial agencies, while Spain lacks any independent 
intelligence organization. The intelligence services that replaced the Securitate106 in 
Romania encompass four independents agencies and two ministerial agencies. Conversely, 
Spain intelligence community is mainly composed of ministerial agencies.107  
1. Romanian Intelligence Agencies 
Romania currently has six intelligence services—the Romanian Intelligence 
Service (SRI), the Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE), the Guard and Protection Service 
(SPP) and the Special Telecommunication Service (STS), the Ministry of Defense’s 
Directorate for General Information of the Armed Forces (DGIA), and the Directorate for 
Intelligence and Internal Protection (DIPI)—all of which originated from the former 
Securitate.108  
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a. Independent Agencies 
The Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI) is responsible for collecting and 
analyzing information related to corruption and national security issues. These powers are 
devolved to the SRI by Decree No. 181 of March 1990, under Law No. 14 of 1992, on the 
organization and functioning of the Romanian Intelligence Service.109 It should be noted 
that the SRI has no powers of arrest and detention. 
The Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE), acting within the legal framework of the 
National Security Act No. 51/1991, is in charge of external intelligence. Their activities 
focus on safeguarding national interests as well as Romanian national security.110 Various 
basic acts (Law No. 415/2002, Law No. 182/2002, and Law No. 1/6 January 1998) regulate 
the organization and functioning of the CSAT as well as the protection of classified 
information of the Foreign Intelligence Service. 
Established by Decree No. 204 in May 1990, under the Law No. 191 of October 
1996, the Guard and Protection Service (SPP) role is to guaranteeing the protection of the 
President, the political leaders, and foreign diplomats.111 In 2002, Emergency Ordinance 
No. 103 increased the powers of the SPP to organize and conduct clandestine operations. 
The Special Telecommunication Service (STS) deals with telecommunications 
activities as well as their organization and coordination regarding public authorities. These 
missions are attributed to them, in accordance with the Law No. 229 of May 1993.112 The 
STS has agents operating undercover and contributes within the framework of signals 
intelligence. 
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b. Intelligence Agencies in Other Agencies 
Under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior, the Directorate of Intelligence 
and Internal Protection (DIPI) created in 1999, is tasked with counter-espionage.113 DIPI, 
also known as UM 0962, collects and analyzes intelligence related to terrorism and 
organized crime. 
The Directorate for General Information of the Armed Forces (DGIA) is a military 
intelligence organization under the authority of the Ministry of Defense. The agency, 
created by Act No. 14 of January 2001, operates undercover and remains in charge of the 
collection and analysis of military and non-military intelligence both inside and outside 
Romania.114 The DGIA includes the Directorate for Intelligence and Military 
Representation (DIRM); and the Directorate for Military Security (DSM). 
2. Spanish Intelligence Agencies 
Spain has seven intelligence agencies, as follows: the National Intelligence Center 
(CNI), the General Commissariat for Intelligence (CGI), the Technological Investigation 
Brigade (BIT), the Civil Guard Intelligence Service (SIGC), the Center of Intelligence of 
Armed Forces (CIFAS), the Customs Surveillance Service (SVA), Intelligence Unit 
(SEPBLAC), and the diplomatic intelligence functions within embassies.115  
a. The National Intelligence Center 
The National Intelligence Center (CNI) is the main Romanian agency created by 
Act No. 11 of May 2002 and is in charge of safeguarding classified information through 
the National Center of Cryptology. The CNI’s main mission is to analyze and provide 
information to the Prime Minister and make proposals that avoid any threats or aggression 
against the territorial integrity of Spain, the stability of its institutions, and all other national 
interests. The CNI benefits from a secret budget in accordance with Act No. 11/95 of March 
11, 1995, as well as representation at home and abroad, which includes a general secretary 
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and three directorates—Operations, Analysis and Resources—for an officer staff estimated 
at 3,500.116  
b. Spanish National Police Intelligence Agencies 
Under the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior, the roles and missions of 
the Office of the Commissioner General for Intelligence (CGI) concern the collection, 
process, and development of public and security intelligence. In accordance with the Royal 
Decree No. 400/2012, which created the CGI, the agency proceeds with the operational 
exploitation of intelligence in the framework of national and international terrorism. 
Intelligence related to the surveillance of networks, precluding cybercrime and terrorism, 
or the protection of minors as well as intellectual and industrial property, are devolved to 
the Technological Investigation Brigade, created in 2002.117 
Moreover, in 2014, Royal Decree No. 873/2014 created the Intelligence Center for 
Terrorism and Organizational Crime (CITCO). This agency serves as a fusion center, 
fighting crime and terrorism. This new structure is the result of the merger of two 
intelligence services, namely the National Center for Anti-Terrorist Coordination and the 
Intelligence Center for Organized Crime. Today, the Center has around 190 personnel from 
different structures (National Police, Prison Authority, CNI, customs, etc.). CITCO 
remains an important structure considering not only the current terrorist threat but also the 
external role in which it operates by participating in international institutions—EU’s 
Serious Organized Crime and Threat Assessment (SOCTA), the international coalition 
against ISIL etc.118 The CNI, together with CITCO, has a task of vetting refugees.  
c. The Civil Guard Intelligence Service 
The Civil Guard Intelligence Service (SIGC) is a paramilitary force with a double 
hat because it operates under the control of both the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry 
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of the Interior. Created in 1941, the SIGC provides public security intelligence and, if 
necessary, conducts operations for this purpose. IACS is in charge of patrolling rural areas 
and also has missions that involve the fight against terrorism, illegal immigration, and 
crime of all kinds.  
d. Center of Intelligence of the Armed Forces 
The Intelligence Center of the Armed Forces is the main Spanish military 
intelligence agency. It was created by a Royal Decree No. 1551 of June 2004 and placed 
under the authority of the General Staff of Defense (EMAD). The roles and missions of 
CIFAS are as follows: 
• Develop an intelligence strategy for all military structures; 
• Guide and coordinate all military intelligence; 
• To warn decision-makers on potential crises looming on the horizon; 
• Maintain connections with counterparts, nationally and internationally.119 
Furthermore, other military services such as Air Force, Army, and Navy are 
component of the Intelligence System of the Armed Forces (SIFAS). They are guided by a 
Joint Military Intelligence Plan generated by both the EMAD and military services’ 
General Staffs. More importantly, SIFAS manages military counterintelligence activities. 
In addition to the Ministries of the Interior and Defense, other departments such as 
the Ministry of the Economy created two intelligence agencies in 1997 and 2014. Their 
mission is not only the fight against drugs, money laundering, smuggling and financial 
escapes (Customs Surveillance Service)120 but also financial intelligence related to the 
prevention of money laundering and terrorism financing (Financial Intelligence Unit). 
Furthermore, the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has intelligence structures in the 
embassies. 
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C. EFFECTIVENESS OF REFORM IN ROMANIA AND SPAIN 
If the high number of intelligence agencies is a hindrance to the effective operation 
of and monitoring of these services, the fact remains that neither Romania nor Spain is an 
exception. Unlike Spain, which has almost a dozen intelligence services, Romania has 
repeatedly been—and continues to be—criticized by its European peers for its large 
number of intelligence agencies, although they have been reduced to six.  
The professionalization of intelligence services is one of the requirements and best 
practices to make secret services much more effective while stimulating democratic 
control. Failure to comply can set back the process of professionalization, which includes 
personnel and career development. In the same context, job opportunities by intelligence 
agencies are offered to young academics and representatives of civil society. The criteria 
for Romania varied according to the tasks. A thoughtful and introspective person could 
potentially become an analyst, while a dynamic person, probably a collector. As far as 
Spain is concerned, the government plans to recruit 500 people by 2020. The special needs 
concern political science, international relations, mathematicians, computer scientists, 
engineers, analysts, management, etc.121  
Staff management is an important part of the intelligence reform process. The 
primary goal is to strengthen the links between different layers within the structures. With 
mutual trust between superiors and subordinates, advancement or career issues are 
effectively managed according to merit and performance.122 To require such criteria, it is 
imperative that the education and professional training conditions of cadres correspond to 
the needs of intelligence agencies.  
Romania and Spain have both strengthened the performance of their intelligence 
agencies through academic institutions dedicated to professional training and education of 
intelligence actors. For example, in 2005, the Spanish CNI in partnership with Spanish 
universities launched an initiative that could lead to an intelligence culture. This initiative 
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contributed a few years later to the creation of a university program in intelligence, making 
intelligence an academic discipline leading to the sector’s professionalization. As far as 
Romania is concerned, the National Intelligence Academy (ANI), and the Higher National 
Security College (HNSC), created by the SRI, are the academic institutions through which 
Romania has gone to professionalize its intelligence community.123 Compared to the 
HNSC—which receives public and parliamentary authorities, journalists, independent 
analysts, as well as educators in the field of security and intelligence—the ANI is 
responsible for the training and education of future intelligence officers in the field of 
religion, foreign cultures and languages, legal affairs, and technical skills. These academic 
institutions, in addition to their contribution to the development and expertise of the actors 
in charge of the control and oversight of information services, use Western faculties or 
organizations to align with international standards, while effectively dealing with current 
threats. 
In addition, these institutions have internal structures dedicated to specialized 
training depending on the types of threats such as organized crime, the fight against 
terrorism, etc. For instance, the Center for Intelligence Against Terrorism (CITCO), was 
created in Spain. CITCO has proved to be one of the most effective anti-terrorist centers in 
Europe. Romania, meanwhile, has military battalions within the DGIA in charge of human 
intelligence (HUMINT), as well as centers for fighting against terrorism and organized 
crime within the SPP and the SRI.124  
D. INTERAGENCY COORDINATION AND COOPERATION IN ROMANIA 
AND SPAIN  
In Romania, interagency cooperation is coordinated by the National Intelligence 
Community (CNI), created in November 2005 under the umbrella of the Supreme Council 
of National Defense (CSAT).125 The CNI is an analytical structure designed to strengthen 
information and to merge the intelligence of all intelligence services, while taking into 
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account the principles governing the spread of intelligence. The CNI is provided with the 
National Doctrine on Intelligence Security, which defines the legal framework and 
guidance on the collection, dissemination, and analysis of domestic and international 
intelligence activities. The CNI’s goal is to professionalize the intelligence community in 
promoting interagency cooperation and coordination. By receiving intelligence summaries, 
from both the domestics actors and at the international level, the CNI could effectively play 
its role not only in producing the right intelligence for policymakers but also by 
participating profoundly in international bodies facing financial terrorism or money 
laundering. 
The Spanish intelligence community activities coordination is done through the 
National Intelligence Center (CNI),126 which reports to the Government Delegate 
Commission for Intelligence Affairs, and is similar to the National Security Council in the 
United States. The National Intelligence Center is under the authority of the Deputy Prime 
Minister. In addition, the CNI and other ministerial agencies maintain an exemplary 
relationship of cooperation and collaboration not only with each other but also with their 
counterparts abroad. 
E. DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN CONTROL AND OVERSIGHT IN ROMANIA 
AND SPAIN 
Both Romania and Spain have striven to develop the required mechanisms—
executive, legislative, judicial, and informal control and oversight—for controlling and 
overseeing the activity of their post-dictatorship intelligence agencies. 
1. Executive Control 
Executive control of intelligence in Romania and Spain involves guidance and 
direction from various institutions. In Romania, it is the National Defense Supreme Council 
(CSAT), created in December 1990 under Law No. 39, which exercises executive control 
over intelligence agencies; while in Spain, it is the Government’s Delegated Committee 
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for Intelligence Affairs (GDCIA), founded under the National Intelligence Center (CNI) 
Law, and complemented by the National Defense Council (CDN) successively created in 
2002 and 2005. Both CSAT in Romania and the CNI/GDCIA in Spain organize and 
coordinate all related intelligence activities.127 However, the executive directions of 
Higher Information Center of Defense (CESID) in Spain, for example, were informal 
between the Minister of Defense and the Director of CESID, contrary to established 
practices between producers and consumers. While in Romania, the Ministry of Public 
Finance audits the financial activities of the agencies by delegating its power of pre-
emptive financial verification and by authorizing the legality of certain collection 
activities.128  
In sum, both Romania and Spain’s executive branches conduct a strong control over 
their intelligence actions. 
2. Legislative Oversight 
 Both Romania and Spain created intelligence oversight bodies in their legislatures. 
In Romania, the legislative oversight of ministries in charge of intelligence is stipulated in 
the constitution and their heads are accountable to that branch of government; intelligence 
agencies report directly to their respective ministries, which in turn are accountable to 
parliament. In Spain, legislative control and oversight formally exist but does not function 
adequately, and is performed—under the CNI Law—by the Congress of Deputies through 
the Defense Committee.129 Despite the Committee’s tremendous powers—allocation of 
confidential resources, yearly reporting on CNI activities, CNI leadership hearings—the 
legislative control remains quasi faulty.130  
                                                 
127 The CSAT is composed of the President, Prime Minister, the President’s National Security 
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Unlike Spain, Romania exerts parliamentary control of intelligence across the 
legislative committees, which may be permanent or special committees that monitor and 
oversee both the intelligence and the independent agencies’ activities.131 The committees’ 
prerogatives extend to the formulation of laws, the approval and control of budgetary 
expenditures, and the appointment and dismissal of state officials in general and the heads 
of intelligence services. Most importantly, these committees can request periodical reports 
from the intelligence organizations.  
Moreover there’s a thread that focuses more on the reactivity of legislative branch. 
These reactive actions are performed by the parliament’s special and standing committees 
over the intelligence organizations, as noted by Matei: 
• Verify Constitutional and legal compliance of the services’ activities; 
• Investigate allegations of illegal intelligence collection; 
• Hold hearings on presidential nominees for director positions; 
• Assess the directors’ annual reports, submitting their reviews to the 
Parliament; 
• Request SRI and SIE data and information  
• Investigate the directors of the agencies and their staff members; 
• Conduct unannounced visits to the agencies.132  
A number of factors on both sides—Romania and Spain—have contributed to the 
challenges faced by the legislature in carrying out its role. These challenges revolve around 
the lack of expertise of legislators, the economic reforms, the creation of new institutions, 
the elections, the lack of cooperation from intelligence services, when needed, as well as 
the required cooperation within parliamentary committees. Over time, Romania has 
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reversed the trend by investing in the training of parliamentarians through several programs 
and by initiating debates, drawing legislators’ attention to the need to protect classified 
information. 
Conversely, legislative control in Spain not only faces the challenges mentioned 
earlier, but also continues to suffer from lack of interest and access to intelligence. This is 
exacerbated by the refusal of the Spanish Ministry of Defense to declassify and share 
information with the parliament.133 However, in 2016, the declassification by the CIA of 
all the CNI’s documents related to the case of the suspicious transport of terrorists in Spain 
has not only re-branded the Spanish intelligence agencies but also restored the IC’s 
reputation in terms of human rights and public trust.134 
In Romania, in addition to legislative control over the budget, parliamentary 
inquiries remain the most powerful means of control. The perfect example would be the 
special committee set up to investigate the CIA’s operations in Romania. As far as Spain 
is concerned, efforts must be made in this area to improve legislative control.  
Although legislative oversight has proven to better control intelligence institutions, 
it still faces challenges. These challenges extend to the responsibility of elected officials to 
citizens, who require transparency, and the functions of intelligence services, which require 
secrecy. It must be recognized that the sense of responsibility and confidence in the 
disclosure of confidential information undermine democratic consolidation. Yet, as Matei 
notes, in established democracies like the United States, it is the executive branch that has 
violated this rule more than the legislative since the application of legislative control in 
1970.135  
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3. Judicial Review 
Despite the legal existence of judicial control in Romania and Spain, the fact 
remains that this mechanism remains very weak and ineffective in both countries. It is by 
a CNI Act 11/2002 of May 6, 2002 that the Spanish intelligence judicial control is 
exercised. The weakness of this type of surveillance is due, on one hand, to a fragile legal 
framework with regard to judicial control136 in Romania, and on the other hand, to the 
failure to comply with the legislative rules governing the Spanish intelligence apparatus in 
this specific area.137 Between 1989 and 2002, for example, the Romanian general 
prosecutor explicitly accorded to the intelligence apparatus 14,267 warrants for 
wiretapping. However, only few cases had been investigated. While in Spain in 1990, the 
CESID refused to grant access to the Spanish High Court on classified documents during 
a wiretapping investigation involving the King and other leaders.138 
4. Informal Oversight 
The media and the NGOs have contributed considerably to the reform of Romanian 
and Spanish secret services. The media, in its role of strengthening democracy, is a 
watchdog in helping to protect citizens from abuse and human rights violations. In Spain, 
for example, 89 percent of abuses committed by the intelligence services are reported by 
the press.139 As for Romania, internal and external mechanisms, such as the Council for 
the Study of Securitate Archives and the European Court of Human Rights, ensure the 
protection of citizens against abuses.140 
In sum, executive control centers primarily on efficiency issues that allow 
intelligence services to perform more productively. Judicial oversight focuses on issues of 
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ownership and legality. Legislators monitor both branches by combining the effectiveness 
and relevance of intelligence activities. This practice is now underway in many new 
democracies, which focuses on the legislative oversight functions. Largely, 
notwithstanding some challenges, the legislative oversight mechanism, which is a subset 
of democratic control, seems to be an adequate tool for new democracies. As proof, the 
Romanian parliament effectively exercises legislative control by keeping the intelligence 
agencies in a regulatory framework corresponding to the standards of responsibility and 
efficiency. Some well-established democracies such as the United States have democratic 
institutions, namely Congress, to render their intelligence organizations more effective. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Staff inherited from a former undemocratic regime creates challenges and obstacles 
faced by policymakers in the face of intelligence resistance to reform. These personnel 
continue with practices that go against the professional code of ethics, such as the illegal 
surveillance of political leaders, corruption, cronyism, drug trafficking, crime, etc. The lack 
of expertise in the implementation of reform added to political quarrels, which has impeded 
effective democratic control of intelligence and reform. In this case, at the dawn of 
intelligence agencies’ democratization in Romania and Spain, both countries have 
encountered great challenges using employees from undemocratic agencies under 
dictatorial regimes. Over time, as a result of the media and Western criticism, Romania and 
Spain countries have progressively reduced their staff either by retiring them or by 
dismissing them, thus averting a serious breach of intelligence services’ democratic 
principles.  
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IV. ANALYSIS, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The case studies of Romania and Spain show that it is possible to achieve 
intelligence accountability while maintaining operational effectiveness in a democracy. 
These countries seem to have gone through the same challenges and threats that Mali is 
currently facing. This chapter analyzes the challenges of democratic intelligence reform in 
Mali and compares them to other cases such as Romania and Spain, while adequately 
addressing the main research question. It also provides a model of democratic reform of 
intelligence for Mali, based on the lessons learned and best practices of the case studies of 
Romania and Spain. 
A. ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN MALI 
In spite of the free and fair elections in 2013 and 2018—the latter election resulting 
in the generation of new policies and the establishment of the executive, legislative, and 
judicial branches—Mali is still facing a series of both external and internal threats. Mali is 
a transitioning democracy; free elections in 2013 and 2018 have not been sufficient to 
reestablish full Malian democracy. Weak institutions, as well as leadership corruption and 
lack of vision, are the most determinant factors contributing to the situation of unrest in the 
present day.141 The ongoing instability in the country, in addition to criminal activities and 
terrorism, originated from the government failing to protect the country against both 
internal and external threats. Furthermore, the lack of minimum infrastructure in the 
northern part of the country, as well as the oppression and marginalization of Tuareg 
people, have caused a sovereignty issue, which remains a prerequisite to achieve any 
modern democracy.142  
Today, the northern part of Mali has escaped the government’s control, leaving 
room for a multitude of violations of human rights, including violations against women, 
girls, and children, related to the conflict, despite the various peace agreements signed 
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between the protagonists, namely the government and the armed groups. This turmoil 
constitutes a significant threat from the rebels’ groups in coalition with Al-Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb, which for decades, has fought for the northern regions’ autonomy. The 
overall uproar creates a lack of trust not only between the elected officials and the security 
forces but also between the security forces and the citizens.  
Greg Hannah, Kevin A. O’Brien, and Andrew Rathmell claim that, “in the situation 
where conflict has not yet ended but parties wish to conduct initial negotiations towards a 
potential settlement, the secrecy involved in intelligence circles means that intelligence 
services can be used to make overtures to former enemies who are not yet trusted by the 
wider population.”143  
While reforming intelligence services remains a long-term process, the fact remains 
that political will is a prerequisite for achieving reform. Based on the two countries 
studied—Romania and Spain—it is clear that policymakers have played an important role 
in motivating the reform of intelligence services. While motivations may be multiple—
external or internal—as mentioned by Bruneau and Matei, political will without the 
necessary expertise of policymakers could lead to ineffective reform of intelligence 
services.144 First, the two case studies—Romania, and Spain—revealed both internal 
incentives (threats, crises, abuse of the old regime, etc.) and external ones (integration into 
regional institutions like EU or NATO) for the success of their reforms. Second, to avoid 
practices that could lead to the deconsolidation of democracy, Romania and Spain have 
systematically opted for intelligence services under democratic control while developing 
the transparency of intelligence structures during the reform. For Mali, neither internal nor 
external incentives prevailed to initiate a steady reform. The types of threats, as 
experienced by Romania and Spain, which have existed for a long time may be valid 
motivations to proceed with Mali’s intelligence reform.  
 In Mali, despite the existence of a legal framework for the three major intelligence 
services, there is still no clear mandate for the entire intelligence community. For example, 
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the DGSE and the General Intelligence Directorate of the Police have redundant missions 
and roles such informing the government on political, economic, social, and cultural 
intelligence aspects. Unlike its Romanian and Spanish counterparts, Mali does not have a 
national doctrine on intelligence security with guidance and legal framework on the 
collection, dissemination, and analysis of domestic and international intelligence activities. 
Unlike Romania and Spain, which from the beginning of their democratic 
transitions established new intelligence structures while maintaining boundaries between 
military, domestic, and foreign intelligence, Mali has not enacted a legal basis for its 
intelligence structures to reflect those that exist in democratic countries. Romania and 
Spain both have an intelligence coordinating body, which so far does not exist in Mali. In 
addition, Romania has independent and ministerial intelligence agencies, unlike Mali and 
Spain, which have only ministerial agencies. Furthermore, the current context of Mali 
requires the country to acquire military and civilian intelligence apparatus; independent 
and ministerial intelligence structures as well as a strategic intelligence fusion agency to 
properly contribute to national and international security.  
Professionalization remains a major challenge for Mali’s intelligence. The lack of 
professionalism is due to the absence of a career plan for all intelligence staff and training, 
education, and equipment for bureaucratic tasks and operational missions. As for Romania 
and Spain, these countries proceeded with their intelligence professionalization by offering 
education, professional training, and job opportunities in the field of intelligence (computer 
science, mathematics, political science, etc.). They also strengthened their intelligence 
effectiveness through academic institutions by the creation of university programs in 
intelligence. These academic institutions, whether internal or external, contributed not only 
to the education of intelligence officers (terrorism, crime, HUMINT, SIGINT, etc.) but also 
to the training of the public, parliamentary authorities, journalists, and independent 
analysts; more importantly, leading to establishing an intelligence culture. 
Unlike Romania and Spain, which have worked to promote the mechanisms 
required to control and monitor the activities of their intelligence agencies, Mali has only 
created such mechanisms on paper.  
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In Mali, a permanent parliamentary intelligence oversight commission with clear 
responsibilities and power does not exist, notwithstanding the existence of a Parliamentary 
Defense and Security Committee in the National Assembly. This committee is literally 
limited to voting laws without having any control over intelligence services’ budgets, 
activities, or organization.145 In Romania, activities pertaining to both intelligence and 
independent agencies are controlled and overseen across the permanent and ad hoc 
legislative committees. Their prerogatives range from voting laws, approving budget 
expenditures, and appointing or dismissing intelligence services heads. But the Spanish 
case has similarities to that of Mali; although legislative control is mentioned in the law, it 
remains ineffective due to lack of interest and access to intelligence. 
In the field of intelligence, the involvement of the judicial branch, which has a 
regulatory role is almost non-existent in Mali, yet both Romania and Spain are much 
different from Mali. In Mali, despite the inclusion of individual rights in the constitution, 
the DGSE derogates from this rule, in the name of raison d’état, to initiate intrusive 
surveillance without any authorization (warrants) from the judiciary.146 In all fairness, 
whether in Romania or Spain, the judicial review, even mentioned in a legal framework, 
did not bring any convincing results. It appears that these shortcomings are due not only to 
the weakness of the laws in this specific area but also to the non-respect of the legislative 
rules governing the intelligence services. 
The informal oversight of intelligence services by the media and civil society has 
proven to be an effective means of democratizing intelligence in both Romania and Spain, 
while Mali has followed closely.  
In sum, the intelligence agencies in Mali remain ineffective and democratically 
uncontrolled with respect to current challenges, and in particular in terms of transparency 
toward citizens. There is a need for policymakers to undertake the necessary reforms to 
reverse this trend and act more practically on intelligence democratization. If this does not 
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happen, the inadequacies noted in the current democratic reform of Malian intelligence will 
have had significant consequences in the consolidation of democracy.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS: A MODEL OF REFORM 
To meet the requirements of national security, it is imperative that new democracies 
carry out the democratization of intelligence through a compromise between democratic 
civilian control and the effectiveness of intelligence, even if this does not seem to be a 
priority for policymakers in Mali. For Mali to effectively use its intelligence apparatus to 
change the course of its history forever, it must undeniably proceed to the reform of its 
intelligence structures. Romania and Spain have indeed begun the reform of their 
intelligence services from the beginning of their democracies to annihilate the threats that 
existed in their countries. 
First, the roadmap for Mali’s intelligence democratization should include a 
strategic plan—including a robust legal framework and solid policies and practices—for 
the effectiveness and control of Malian intelligence agencies, as well as institutions capable 
to implement this strategic plan. Specifically, this plan should include redefining the roles 
and missions of the intelligence services, functioning inter-agency coordination and 
cooperation (including a mechanism under the aegis of the very next structure of the 
National Security Council)147, democratic control over the intelligence in terms of budget, 
transparency, IC activities, de-politicization of intelligence, and professionalization of 
intelligence, which should crown the reform process to ultimately create a culture of 
intelligence.  
This reform requires the involvement of all stakeholders, namely the executive, 
legislature, and judicial branches; reform through parliament must be favored. Therefore, 
the mandate and roles of the intelligence services are defined in accordance with those 
branches as well as other informal bodies such as the media, NGOs, and civil society. The 
level of threats, risks, and financial resources are critical factors to consider in the 
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intelligence reform process. These key elements make it possible to determine not only the 
number of intelligence services to be established but also their size in terms of personnel, 
while preventing their mandates from overlapping, avoiding redundancy. 
1. Legal Framework 
The intelligence services in Mali have so far escaped democratic control, although 
they are part of the legal framework. The laws governing intelligence services in Mali have 
hardly ever changed since their development. These structures, which face historical 
challenges, operate in an outdated legal framework. For example, the DGSE responsible 
for both internal and external intelligence contributes significantly to its inefficiency. For 
this reason, the application of regulatory texts in accordance with democratic practices is 
more than necessary for the success of the reform. This is all the more relevant as 
intelligence services are generally criticized for their unorthodox practices in the field of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. To this end, the reform would serve to develop 
new laws in line with existing threats, so as to frame the activities of the intelligence 
services in every detail. 
2. Parliamentary Oversight  
While Parliament remains the privileged arm for better control of intelligence 
services, the fact remains that in the context of Mali, there is a need to establish significant 
modifications so that it can successfully fulfill its control mission. Therefore, the legislature 
should start by creating permanent, temporary, and investigative committees, able to 
approve not only the strategies and doctrines of intelligence, but also the budgets and 
appointments of intelligence heads, while exercising parliamentary control over the 
activities of these structures. The lack of expertise of the control committee members in 
charge of security and intelligence requires that parliamentary subcommittees be created 
to address these shortcomings.  
3. Executive Accountability  
Although the intelligence services report directly to the various government 
structures—presidency, defense, security—to which they are subject; in Mali, the 
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responsibilities—guidance and direction—on both sides between the President 
(Commander-in-Chief of the Armed and Security Forces), the Prime Minister in charge of 
the application of the defense policy and the other bodies (High Council of Defense, and 
ministries in charge of the field of intelligence) are not clearly defined. The DGSE reports 
directly to the President, while it is the Prime Minister who is responsible to the National 
Assembly for government action. Neither a national security policy nor a doctrine defining 
intelligence roles exists to this day.  
In this regard, the very first recommendations focus on two aspects: the creation of 
a national intelligence coordination structure and/or the establishment of a government-
level intelligence committee. These structures will be responsible not only for coordinating 
all activities pertaining to the field of intelligence with the appropriate departments but also 
for supervising and disseminating the correct information. 
The new intelligence coordination structure could be established under the auspices 
of the newly created National Security Council, serving as an analytical structure designed 
to strengthen intelligence, merge intelligence gathered from different intelligence 
structures both internally and externally, and oversee the principles of governance and 
intelligence dissemination. This new structure, acting in accordance with the national 
intelligence doctrine, will have the mission of professionalizing the intelligence 
community while promoting interagency cooperation and coordination.  
4. Judicial Supervision  
The unorthodox practices of the intelligence services in Mali, in regard to 
respecting individual rights and freedoms, require that succinct provisions be included in 
the field of law. For example, the creation of inspector general positions within the 
intelligence services will limit the harm and especially reduce these structures to act within 
a legal framework.  
5. Media and Civil Society  
Malian media continues to play a prominent role in the informal control of 
intelligence agencies. Since the advent of democracy, the media has never stopped 
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criticizing the excesses of the intelligence services. It should be pointed out that the secret 
police practices of these services prompted the civil society, at the 1991 national 
conference, to ask that the DGSE be purely and simply dissolved.148 Unfortunately, 
although the media and civil society play their roles in controlling intelligence, they are 
still struggling to achieve the desired results. Moreover, the desired end state is to get the 
intelligence services to act in accordance with individual rights and freedoms. Thus, public 
transparency remains a key element in the reform process as it contributes to improving 
the image of intelligence services.  
6. Mali’s Intelligence Services Structure  
Today the organization/structure of the three intelligence services of Mali—DGSE, 
DSM, and DGRG—is not properly configured to cope with the security environment 
effectively. It is important that the laws governing intelligence agencies in Mali be 
thoroughly reviewed so that these structures can properly perform their roles and missions. 
Given the many reforms underway since the 2012 crisis, intelligence reform must take into 
account future changes in terms of national security, in particular the creation of the future 
National Security Council, to avoid any redundancy, and lessons learned from errors 
committed in the past, especially those that could be a blow to the success of the reform. 
The major effect of the reform is the creation or reorganization of the structures in charge 
of intelligence in order to face security issues at national and international levels. It is 
imperative that the reform take into account a better organization of the intelligence 
structures according to the threats, and the country’s National Strategy. To avoid falling 
into the trap of some democratic countries—those with too many intelligence agencies—
Mali should reorganize its intelligence structures with the creation of the following 
agencies: 
• A National Directorate of Intelligence Coordination 
• A General Directorate of Foreign Intelligence (Foreign) 
• A General Directorate of Internal Security (Domestic) 
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• A Directorate of Military Security (Military) 
Intelligence units at the Ministry of Finance or Foreign Affairs can be created to address 
the critical need in these specific areas.  
The creation of a central coordination structure would not only facilitate 
cooperation between intelligence institutions but also avoid redundancies and rivalries in 
terms of roles, missions, and budget allocation, allowing for adequate responses to the 
country’s internal and external threats. The establishment of these new structures should 
take into account a legal framework covering all the shortcomings regarding legislation so 
that the intelligence services have roles and missions reflecting those that function in a 
democracy. 
While the National Directorate of Intelligence Coordination would serve as a center 
for coordination, collection, and intelligence analysis, the General Directorate of Foreign 
Intelligence would function as an alert by obtaining and evaluating intelligence related to 
external security. The General Directorate of Internal Security would be responsible for 
obtaining and evaluating all information pertaining to internal security while protecting the 
country against all threats related to espionage, terrorism, crime, and it also law 
enforcement roles. Finally, the Directorate of Military Security would aim to detect any 
military intelligence related to the capabilities of opposing and foreign armies. Other 
challenges that Mali could face is the reform itself so it ensures the effectiveness of 
intelligence services without compromising its re-democratization. While intelligence 
agencies demand frequent reforms based on national security priorities, the most pressing 
issues that need to be addressed include maintaining the balance between transparency and 
secrecy, the creation of control and supervision structures to maximize the IC overall 
effectiveness, budget control of intelligence services and use of intelligence-gathering 
methods, and the ethics or probity of intelligence personnel and their professionalism.149  
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7. Professionalism of Intelligence Services  
The professionalization of the intelligence services during the reform process 
inevitably requires the attention of decision-makers to the training and recruitment of 
intelligence executives. Malian intelligence reform should have no other purpose than to 
contribute not only to the consolidation of democracy but also to the creation of a new 
intelligence community that contributes effectively to national and international security. 
This reform should also focus on creating an intelligence corps with legitimate leadership 
that meets the democratic criteria of selection. From there, it would be possible to establish 
a personnel management system based on well-defined criteria, allowing the intelligence 
services to fully fulfill their contract. Such efforts will ultimately lead to an intelligence 
culture.150  
To sum up, though Mali was once considered one of the best countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa, it must reverse the cyclical course of its history of deconsolidating its 
democracy by studying the experiences of new democracies, such as Romania or Spain, to 
consolidate democracy. If reforming the intelligence services appears to be a difficult and 
long-term process, its success allows for guaranteed national stability and potential 
international security. By remaining in a democratic and international context that meets 
the standard of use of the intelligence services, the reform of the intelligence services of 
Mali will contribute considerably to counter the real threats of separatism, terrorism, 
organized crime, and corruption. Consequently, these recommendations must be 
implemented to achieve the expected results. 
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